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In South Africa, property protection and regulation is acaptivating issue. Section 25 of the 1996 Constitutionrepresents one of the most complex deals that resulted
from the negotiations for a new democracy. This property
clause regulates the extent to which the state can justiﬁably
place restrictions on private property; and the
circumstances under which compensation can be claimed
for such restrictions. It goes further, by providing a
blueprint for reforming existing patterns of control over
land. It contains a commitment to the objectives of access
to land, provision of legally secure land tenure, land
restitution and related reforms. This contribution discusses
the South African Constitutional Court’s treatment of the
dialectic interests for which section 25 caters.
By now it is trite that the South African property clause
is characterised by inherent tension between its
dichotomously protective and reformative aspects (AJ van
der Walt, Constitutional Property Law, (2005) 17). This is
reinforced by the interaction of section 25 with other
fundamental rights provisions, such as the right to housing
(s 26), just administrative action (s 34) etc. The exact
provisions of section 25 read:
25 (Property)
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of
general application, and no law may permit arbitrary
deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general
application – (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest;
and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the
time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed
to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable
balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including
– (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the
acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the
property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy
in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the
property; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section – (a) the public interest
includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s
natural resources; and (b) property is not limited to land.
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices
is entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either
to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking
legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination,
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is
in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).
The general tenor of academic work regarding South
African constitutional property law is that the political
compromise embodied in the property guarantee,
alongside the many comparative inﬂuences that shaped its
character, caused some uncertainty as to the exact meaning
and content of the property clause.i The burgeoning body
of case lawii in which section 25 had been considered,
shows that the universally unavoidable problem, regardless2
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of the intricacies of any given case, still is to determine and
justify the parameters of permissible legislative
interference with speciﬁc property rights. This refers to
issues concerning (i) the kind of interferences with
property envisaged; (ii) the purposes that would justify
such interference; (iii) the kind of interference that would
give rise to compensation; and (iv) how compensation
should be determined in such cases.
Central to the resolution of all of these issues is the
relation between existing private property interests and
state purposes. This resounds in questions, frequently
broached in case law, about the kinds of duties attributed
to the state in dealings with private property and public
interest; and the responsibilities befalling individuals whose
property rights are affected by state conduct. To explore
the South African Constitutional Court’s take on this
central and inﬂuential element of the emerging law on
constitutional property protection, the standards set by the
Constitutional Court’s ﬁrst major engagement with section
25 in the well-known case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a
Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service;
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance
2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) / 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) are
brieﬂy considered. This forms the point of departure for a
closer analysis of three further decisions of the
Constitutional Court, and the impact they have on issues
relating to the parameters of permissible legislative
interference with speciﬁc property rights.
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The 2002 Constitutional Court decision in First National
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of
Finance (“the FNB decision”) was the ﬁrst major engagement
with section 25. It still represents the most comprehensive
consideration to date of the structure and application of
section 25 to particular disputes. As such, it remains a
valuable account of the framework for constitutional
property protection and regulation in South Africa.
The case dealt with the constitutionality of a law (s 114
of the Customs and Excise Act 91/1964) permitting the
conﬁscation, by the Revenue Service, of movable property
(vehicles) belonging to First National Bank, to settle the tax
debt of some of the bank’s debtors, who were purchasing
the property by way of installments. In applying section 25
to the matter, the court conﬁrmed (para 59 ff) that the
South African Constitution foresees a broad range of
limitations on property rights generally designated as
“deprivations.” “Expropriations” are deprivations that give
rise to compensation, and which form a special
“subcategory” within the system of limitations. Under
section 25(1), the basic requirements for all deprivations
(also expropriations) are that they must be undertaken by
a law of general application and may not be arbitrary. They
must also, in terms of section 36(1) be reasonable and
justiﬁable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom. In addition,
expropriations are expressly required by section 25(2)(a) to
be for a public purpose or in the public interest. A
constitutionally valid expropriation must give rise to the
payment of compensation, in terms of section 25(2)(b)
read with section 25(3)(a) to (e), which determines how
such compensation should be calculated.
Then the court used the requirement in section 25(1),
that deprivations of property may not be “arbitrary”, to
develop a ﬂexible test, by which to determine whether there
was “sufﬁcient reason” for an infringement upon property
rights (para 100 ff). The test entailed the consideration of
various relationships between the infringement, its purpose,
the law effecting it, the property affected and its nature. In
this particular case, the court found that the “net [was cast]
far too wide”, and the provision was accordingly declared
unconstitutional (para 108).
The court’s stance on how the “sufﬁcient reason” test
should be understood, gives some idea on the purposes
that would justify the infringement of property rights: The
more extensive the affected property interest or
restriction, the more compelling the purpose of the
restriction would have to be (para 100(e)-(f)). Through
this engagement with the complex relationship between
the individual and the state, it becomes clear that the
instances where the additional requirements for
expropriation are not applicable will be most problematic.
In the case of expropriation, it is expressly stated that the
public interest or a public purpose must justify the
infringement. There is no such express requirement for
deprivations in general. It is assumed that restrictions
promoting public health or safety should be permissible,
because it is a traditional function of the state to regulate
the use and enjoyment of private property for these reasons
(A J van der Walt, The Constitutional Property Clause, 1997,
103 ff, 129 ff). But whether other state functions warrant
infringement, and to what extent, were matters that could
not be clariﬁed in FNB.
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
JURISPRUDENCE
FNB illustrated that the justiﬁcation for valid
infringement pivots on the relationship between “the
sacriﬁce the individual is asked to make and the public
purpose this is intended to serve” (para 98). This latter
point is underscored by the spirit of the South African
Constitution, and has gained further importance in
subsequent case law.
The South African constitution’s commitment to the
core value of social justice in its preamble attests to the
inﬂuence of, among others, the idea of social responsibility
on our law (further details in H Mostert, Constitutional
Protection and Regulation of Property, (2002) Springer 148ff).
As regards property in particular, the dual character of 3
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section 25 as a means to protect rights and to promote
social justice, further conﬁrms that under the Constitution,
property does not have the same kind of inviolable
conceptual integrity as one often encounters in
conventional, private-law thinking (see AJ van der Walt,
Constitutional Property Clause, (1997, Juta) 55ff; conﬁrmed in
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217
(CC) para 15; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank
of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768
(CC) / 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) paras 50-52.) Instead,
the whole make-up of the property guarantee pivots on the
recognition that private property is limited by the exercise
of state powers for the public good. The constitutional
paradigm thus already incorporates an acknowledgement
that private rights are subject to societal considerations or,
conversely, that there rests a responsibility upon private
owners to exercise their rights in a way that is conducive to
the general public weal (H Mostert “Liberty, Social
Responsibility and Fairness in the Context of
Constitutional Property Protection and Regulation,” in H
Botha et al, Rights and Democracy in a Transformative
Constitution (2003) Sun Press 159). What remains, is to
establish the scope of such an individual responsibility for
promoting the public interest.
The FNB court’s remark that reasons for infringement
would have to be more compelling in some cases than in
others (see above) raises the idea that the social relevance of
a particular property interest contributes to the level of
protection it deserves, and the degree of sacriﬁce expected
from the individual holder. As case law proliferates,
considerations such as these are becoming cemented into
the structure of the constitutional property law inquiry. This
may be demonstrated by a closer look at three further
decisions from the South African Constitutional Court.
They are Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1)
SA 217 (CC) / 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC), (the “PE
Municipality case”); Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
Municipality; Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer
Rights Action Campaign and Others v Member of the Executive
Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others
2005 1 SA 530 (CC), (the “Mkontwana case”); and President
of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri
SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2005 (5) SA 3
(CC) / 2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC), (the “Modderklip case”).
The PE Municipality case dealt with eviction. At stake was
the fate of a small group of about 68 unlawful occupiers, of
which about a third were children. They were settled in
shacks on unused, private, vacant land within the
jurisdiction of the municipality who applied for eviction, at
the instance of the landowners, and who denied that it was
legally obliged to ﬁnd suitable alternative accommodation.
The essential issue was the manner in which the
constitutional right to property can be restricted by the
applicability of other fundamental rights, such as the right
to housing.
The Mkontwana case was decided just a few days after PE
Municipality. It dealt with the question whether interference
with individual owners’ ability to alienate their land was
permissible, to promote the state’s ability to collect
outstanding debts. The owners who were party to the
matter were affected by section 118 of the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32/2000 or sections
49 and 50(1)(a) of the Gauteng Local Government
Ordinance 17/1939. These laws have different application,
but more or less the same effect in that they put the
responsibility for ensuring payment of consumption
charges squarely on the shoulders of private property
owners, by placing an embargo on sale of the land where
charges for consumption of water and electricity are
outstanding. In this way, the laws established a security
interest in favour of the municipalities involved. In all the
matters that were joined for hearing, the owners
themselves did not incur the debts, because there were
either tenants or unlawful occupants on the property. In
some instances, the owners were not even aware that the
debts were escalating, due to the poor administrative
practices of the municipalities involved (Mkontwana, para
18). The Constitutional Court essentially had to establish
whether the relevant legislation resulted in arbitrary
deprivations of property (Mkontwana, para 31, 33 ff).
The Modderklip case was decided about half a year later.
It arose from the inability of the state to assist landowners
in exercising a legitimate eviction order, obtained from a
lower court, to control the massive, incessant inﬂux of
unlawful occupiers onto their land. A vast informal
settlement had established itself by the time the matter
came before the Constitutional Court.iii It had to decide
upon the kind of relief, if any, that the state was obliged to
provide to the landowners (Modderklip, para 42).
The constitutional property guarantee formed part of
the resolution to each of the disputes, albeit in very distinct
ways. For Mkontwana, an FNB-style analysis and application
of section 25 was central to the problem. PE Municipality
and Modderklip did not contain an outright analysis of
section 25. They nevertheless are important for an
understanding of the interference parameter of private
property, because of the manner in which they deal with
the relation between property and other fundamental
rights, such as housing.
The problems posed by each of the cases had serious
implications for the public order. The housing need,
landlessness and queue-jumping were issues that arose in
both PE Municipality and Modderklip. The effectiveness of the
sanctions available to the state were at stake in both
Modderklip and Mkontwana. They also reﬂected problems
with social transformation where the state is incapable of
providing basic means to enforce rights.
In all three of these cases, the Constitutional Court’s
decisions were informed by an engagement with the duties
and responsibilities of both the state and the various private4
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stakeholders involved. It is noticeable that the court in each
of these three decisions adheres to a notion of individual
duty towards the achievement of state goals. The term used
in Mkontwana, “civic responsibility” (para 38, 52),
summarises the idea quite well. There are explanations, in
each of the respective decisions that support this notion,
even though it is not expressly named in all instances.
In the Mkontwana case, the court (through Yacoob J)
found that a government purpose which is legitimate and
compelling would constitute “sufﬁcient reason”, if it would
not be unreasonable to expect an individual to carry the
burden thereof in a particular case. The court decided that
the owners could reasonably be expected to bear the risk of
unpaid consumption charges (para 51). It relied heavily on
the idea that private owners must contribute proactively to
discharging the state’s duties, referring to this as the “civic
responsibility” (para 38, 59). Because the beneﬁt of
municipal services is an integral, value-enhancing aspect of
the property, it was found that landowners should remain
responsible for consumption charges (paras 40-42, 53,
61), even where the service was delivered to non-owners
(para 47); and even if municipalities’ debt collection
structures were patently deﬁcient (para 19-23). The
bottom line is that owners must protect their property
themselves and ensure that its entitlements can be
exercised (para 59). In Mkontwana, the court thus
developed the idea that individual landowners are expected
to shoulder the responsibility for the achievement of state
goals or the exercise of state duties, because they are
connected to it through the beneﬁts that directly or
indirectly befall their property (para 53).
At around the same time, the PE Municipality decision
developed a similar idea. Sachs J’s decision in PE
Municipality acknowledged that the judiciary must manage
the counterposition of the conventional rights of
ownership against the new, equally relevant right not to be
capriciously deprived of a home, without creating
hierarchies of privilege (para 23). In this sense, the court
views itself as the guardian of the public interest (para 29),
and the manager of the constitutional attempt to create
what the court called a “caring society based on good
neighbourliness and shared concern” (para 37). The court
clearly herewith recognized the idea of civic responsibility,
and underscored it with references to the communitarian
philosophy of ubuntu and the “need for human
interdependence, respect and concern” (para 37). The
court required of all those involved in issues of property
protection and housing to avoid self-victimisation; and to
be adaptable and resourceful in ﬁnding ways out of
whatever their predicament is. They should look beyond
the stereotypes of social nuisance to recognize the dire
needs created by poverty and homelessness and do
something about it. This understanding of civic
responsibility means that in matters of eviction, sacriﬁce
and proactiveness are required both from landowners and
occupants (para 20).
Whereas the idea of “civic responsibility” as espoused by
these cases certainly promises transformation-friendly
solutions to property problems, the outcome of Mkontwana
anticipates that civic responsibility can also place patently
unreasonable burdens on individuals. This is illustrated
even better by the state’s argument in the Modderklip case.
The state raised an argument a la Mkontwana: the owners of
Modderklip brought their woes upon themselves by not
taking effective steps to protect their property at a point
when the problem could still have been manageable (para
27). This was a low blow to the Modderklip owners, given
all that they had done to try to resolve their problem
themselves, and given the state’s irresponsiveness to their
attempts (paras 8, 9, 13, 41ff, 48). Yet even this abuse of
the idea that ownership entails obligations does not
eliminate the possibilities offered by reliance on civic
responsibility in deﬁning casuistically the exact parameter
of property interference. It merely shows that civic
responsibility as a factor inﬂuencing the interference
parameter needs to be counterposed.
The idea of state duty in the realization of fundamental
rights presents itself as a suitable counter-mechanism. This
concept is being developed in respect of fundamental
rights theory in general, as an alternative to the
complexities of the debate surrounding the horizontal
application of fundamental rights (see eg A J van der Walt,
“Transformative constitutionalism and the development of
South African property law” (2005) TSAR 655-89 and
(2006) TSAR 1-31). As regards issues of property and
housing in particular, PE Municipality engaged seriously with
the duties of the state in resolving the problem. Sachs J saw
the state’s obligation as one of mitigating, rather than
intensifying, the marginalization of the poor and the
homeless (para 18), to meet the demands of the
Constitution. So, while civic responsibility was endorsed
unequivocally, even more was demanded from the state,
especially in view of the duty to provide access to housing.
The court in PE Municipality refused to endorse the granting
of an eviction, because the municipality did not do enough
to ﬁnd a mediated solution, and did not attend to the
genuine needs of the occupiers (para 59).
The importance of state involvement is even more
obvious in the context of Modderklip. There the court
acknowledged the duty of private owners to protect their
own property, but found the state’s argument along the
lines of civic responsibility unconvincing in view of the
landowners’ proactive and ongoing, yet futile, attempts to
resolve the problem (para 44). The court regarded the
state’s conduct as unreasonable, because it forced private
owners to shoulder the burden of providing alternative
housing for the unlawful occupants (para 49 ff). The court
stressed that the state’s actions cannot be seen to condone
queue-jumping as regards access to land and housing (par
34), but it also cannot aggravate the victimization of the
landowners affected by rampant, massive unlawful
occupation (para 44). 5
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In Modderklip, the state’s dilemma was that if it carried
out the eviction order, it would cause major social upheaval
and misery (paras 46-47); and if it failed to enforce the
eviction, it would seriously disrupt the public order. Either
way, the rule of law would be compromised. Even so, the
court held that the state cannot simply “stand by and do
nothing” (para 48), just because they want to discourage
queue-jumping for housing (para 49). The state has the
constitutional duty to ensure progressive realization of the
right to access to housing and land, even if its task is
immensely difﬁcult, resources scarce and competition
intense among people living in the bleakest of conditions
(para 49). Under the circumstances, the court found, a
more serious attempt could have been made to expropriate
the occupied land. That would have alleviated the
Modderklip owners from bearing a burden patently befalling
the state. The court ordered that the occupiers be allowed
to stay on the land, against payment of compensation by
the state to the landowners (para 68). It seems as if the
court had in mind some form of equalisation payment (A J
van der Walt, 2005 SAJHR 144-61; Constitutional Property
Law, 2005, 333), although it does not elaborate on the
nature of the proposed compensation. It simply indicated
that the amount could be set off against any future amount
payable in terms of an expropriation (para 64).
It is noticeable, therefore, that considerations of state
duty and civic responsibility inﬂuenced the outcome of all
these cases. In Mkontwana, considerations of civic
responsibility were strong enough for the court to turn a
blind eye to the possible inefﬁciencies of the state in
fulﬁlling some of its functions. In Modderklip, part of what
made the judgment against the state so convincing was the
fact that the landowners in that case acted in a “civilly
responsible” manner. In both Modderklip and PE
Municipality, however, the state’s conduct was also
considered more critically than was the case in Mkontwana.
In both these decisions, the perceived passivity of the state
in resolving matters of housing and landlessness tilted the
scales against it.
ASSESSMENT
The interplay between civic responsibility and state duty
will have to be thrashed out doctrinally elsewhere, because
the scope of this discussion does not allow much more
than a few observations. First, as regards the nature of the
purposes that would justify infringement upon private
property, the FNB structure and particularly its application
in the Mkontwana case demonstrates the need for
“compelling and legitimate” state purposes. Though ﬁscal
efﬁciency was held to be such a state purpose in Mkontwana,
the decision was criticized severely for the dubious manner
in which it elevated deﬁciencies in the state’s debt
management system to a public purpose, to be remedied
by depriving individuals of property (A J van der Walt,
“Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already?
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v
Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC
for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng (CC),” (2005)
SALJ 84). The relation between FNB and Mkontwana also
show that even for a single state purpose – that of the state’s
ﬁscal efﬁciency – the application of the “sufﬁcient reason”
test may have very different consequences.
By contrast, the purposes at stake in Modderklip and PE
Municipality were the need to eradicate homelessness
alongside the duty to give effect to the fundamental right to
housing. Modderklip conﬁrmed that limitation of landowners’
rights of exclusion for this reason can be regarded as
compelling and legitimate, and be a valid deprivation of
property. The court expects the landowners to tolerate this
infringement, but not to carry the risk of achievement thereof,
as was the case in Mkontwana. PE Municipality also conﬁrmed
that the imposition placed upon landownership by anti-
eviction measures is legitimate and compelling, even where
their effect is rather extreme. The court here even went as
far as indicating that tolerance of such impositions is a
proverbial two-way street between the private stakeholders
involved. In cases where there are contesting private
stakeholders, the state’s involvement must be facilitative.
Second, Mkontwana (like FNB) turned upon the question
of “how far” the relevant infringement went: a question that
depended on how the interests of the owners and the nature
of the property affected are weighed against the public
interest. The politics on which such an assessment is based
– the importance of a “pro-government” decision – were
not revealed. By contrast, both Modderklip and PE Municipality
expressly recognised pressing social realities such as poverty
and “intense competition for scarce resources” in ﬁnding
that passivity on the part of the state cannot be tolerated in
matters of housing. These examples render it all the more
strange that state passivity can be overlooked and private
individuals be expected to carry the risk when (as in
Mkontwana) the purpose of ﬁscal efﬁciency is at stake.
Third, on a structural level, reliance on civic
responsibility and state duty may open up possibilities that
were eliminated by what had been dubbed the
“artibrariness vortex” created by FNB. Essentially,
according to this argument, the FNB-type inquiry based
on section 25 is unnecessarily complicated, since it favours
ﬁndings upon the basis of rationality, proportionality and
justiﬁability of infringements. It brushes over issues that
may be regarded as “technical”, ie questions such as (i)
whether a property interest is at stake; and (ii) whether a
given action amounts to an infringement at all. A potential
mechanism with which to “ﬁlter out” some matters at an
early stage of the inquiry is thus reduced or even
eliminated (T Roux “Property,” in Stuart Woolman et al
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2003), 2nd ed,
Butterworths LexisNexis). An interactive application of the
notions of civic responsibility and state duty could leave
room for the question whether rights had actually been curtailed
to take a more prominent place in the constitutional
property inquiry. As such, it responds to the difﬁculties of6
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a structure which requires essentially that ﬁndings be based
upon rationality or proportionality of interference. Though
it of course may inform these aspects of an inquiry too,
reliance on civic responsibility and state duty could also
pave the way for a doctrine in terms of which the social
function of property assumes that some types of
interference with property does not warrant very intensive
levels of scrutiny.
Fourth, much more clarity on the results of particular
inroads on property is needed, especially if we take into
account the FNB legacy. FNB left very little room for an
argument that the violation of property rights under the
deprivations clause may give rise to compensation (for
further details, see H Mostert, “The Distinction between
Deprivations and Expropriations and the Future of the
‘Doctrine’ of Constructive Expropriation in South Africa,”
2003 (4) SAJHR 567-92). To some extent, Modderklip – in
adhering to the goals of PE Municipality’s social-contextual
approach, addresses this problem. It anticipated the
payment of an unidentiﬁed type of compensation for
violation of the rights guaranteed by the deprivations clause.
It thus contextualizes the homelessness problem in relation
to the state’s constitutional duty to do what is possible,
within its resource capacity, to eradicate the problem.
CONCLUSION
A viable model for determining the interference
parameter of property needs to be cognizant of the politics
behind particular state goals. In addition, considerations
summarized by the term “civic responsibility” must be
acknowledged as having a central role in shaping the
structure of constitutional property protection in South
Africa. It can have a very real impact on the technical
aspects of the law. If property law is to develop in a manner
sensitive to the constitutional goals of transformation, it is
vital to acknowledge that, ﬁrst, property does not denote
only rights of ownership in the narrow conventional
private-law sense, but also a broader range of entitlements
and interests. Second, this notion of property needs to
develop not so much along rights-based lines, but instead
towards a more serious engagement with the
responsibilities underlying property. The South African
constitution endorses that owners must be tolerant of
inroads upon their rights, for the sake of the broader public
weal. In fact, even more is required. Owners must be both
proactive and resourceful in ﬁnding solutions to property
problems with signiﬁcant socio-political dimensions.
Adherence to the civic responsibility inherent in
ownership, however, by no means implies that the state
may abdicate its own duties in creating a society based on
the values of democracy, freedom, social justice and the
rule of law. A heightened awareness of the duties inherent
in private ownership brings with it an increased demand on
the state to be involved, facilitative, meditative, in fact
instrumental, in resolving the tensions between the public
interest and private rights.
From an individualistic perspective, the South African
case law illustrates that the line between what can be
regarded as tolerable sacriﬁce for the public good and what
not, is sometimes very ﬁne. In one instance it may be
simply sufﬁcient to hold (as in the FNB decision) that the
legislature has “cast the net far too wide.” In other
instances, as PE Municipality illustrates, a cocktail of social
and political considerations - such as “neighbourliness and
shared concern”, resourcefulness against the odds and
state involvement – is required to deﬁne the interference
parameter of private property.
It would have been easier to make generalisations about
how far civic responsibility could be stretched, and to what
extent state duty counterposes individual involvement in
the resolution of property measures, if there had at least
been more clarity on the kinds of state purposes that would
justify severe inroads on private rights. The examples
available in the South African context deal at present only
with the solution of the homelessness problem and with
the state’s ﬁscal efﬁciency. As concerns homelessness, the
South African Constitutional Court requires strong
intervention from the state, even if a good measure of civic
responsibility is demanded – both from landowners and
unlawful occupants – to make solutions work. As regards
the state’s ability to manage debt effectively, there seems to
be less of a trend.
What deﬁnitely is noticeable is the Constitutional
Court’s impatience with any form of passivity, be it on the
part of the state or the interested property holder. In
Modderklip, PE Municipality and Mkontwana – despite their
vastly different subject matter and outcomes – the
Constitutional Court is pronouncedly against attitudes
smacking of an unwillingness on the part of interested
parties to get involved and to be resourceful in tackling
problems related to property. This gives at least some idea
about the outcome of future decisions about the
interference parameter of private property.
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Clause” (2004) South African Law Journal 854-78; André J van der Walt,
“Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City
Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC for Local
Government and Housing, Gauteng (CC)” (2005) South African Law
Journal 75-89. André J van der Walt, Constitutional Property Law (2005)
Juta). For analyses dealing with the interaction between
constitutional property protection and other fundamental
rights issues: André J van der Walt, “The State’s Duty to Protect
Property Owners vs the State’s Duty to Provide Housing: Thoughts on
the Modderklip Case” (2005) South African Journal on Human Rights 144-
61; André J van der Walt, “Ownership and Eviction: Constitutional
Rights in Private Law” (2005) Edinburg Law Review 32-64; André J van
der Walt, “The state’s duty to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation for
expropriation: reﬂections on the Du Toit case” (2005) South African Law
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Reg 1-31; Warren Freedman, “The constitutional right not to be
deprived of property: the Constitutional Court keeps its options open”
(2006) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 83-100; André J van der Walt,
“Reconciling the state’s duties to promote land reform and to pay ‘just
and equitable’ compensation for expropriation” (2006) South African Law
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ii The ﬁrst extensive consideration of s 25 by the Constitutional Court
was in 2002, in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for
the South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) / 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC),
which is discussed here. Various provincial and local divisions of the
High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have also considered s 25
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Property Solution CC 2003 2 SA 136 (C); City of Cape Town v Rudolph and
Others 2003 11 BCLR 1236 (C); Abrams v Allie NO and Others 2004 9
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Government & Others [2006] JOL 16700 (SE); Prophet v National Director of
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